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Property Rights and the Distinction
Between Procedural and Substantive
Laws
Receipt of an eviction notice is unquestionably bad news for any
tenant in residential rental property, especially in light of critically
low vacancy rates in many California cities.' Tenants who pay rent
on a timely basis and otherwise satisfy leasehold obligations, yet suffer
eviction by operation of law, are particularly deserving of sympathy.
Historically, however, real property law has allocated certain risks
of termination of tenancy and eviction for holding over even to
nondefaulting tenants.2 Thus, a tenant whose leasehold is created subse-
quent to a recorded deed of trust on real property has been subject
to eviction if the trustor defaults and the property is sold in
foreclosure.3 In California, both statutory and case law supports this
position.4
Given the settled principle that foreclosure of a mortgage extinguishes
subsequent leaseholds and other inferior interests, both landlord and
tenant groups took great interest in a California appellate court deci-
sion, Gross v. Superior Court,5 which held that a foreclosure sale
purchaser could not evict a tenant under state eviction statutes because
of protections afforded in a local rent control ordinance.6 Tenants'
counsel maintain that were the decision otherwise, the very founda-
tions of local rent control would be undermined.7 Landlord interests
1. According to a written list supplied by the California Association of Realtors, residen-
tial vacancy rates in California are commonly below three percent and frequently below two
percent. Data compiled by the California Association of Realtors from the Los Angeles Apart-
ment Association, California Apartment Association, and California Housing Council (on file
at the Pacific Law Journal).
2. Historically, California law has permitted eviction for tenants holding over after ter-
mination of the tenancy, which can be terminated for any reason upon compliance with the
statutory notice period. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1946. Hence, nondefaulting tenants have been
subject to termination and eviction because the landlord wanted to personally occupy the unit,
have the unit occupied by friends or family, sell or rehabilitate the unit, or for any other
reason unrelated to the tenants' behavior. Numerous attempts to limit the grounds for evicting
tenants have been rejected by the California Legislature.
3. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1161(a)(b).
4. Bank of America v. Hirsch Merc. Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 175, 182-83, 148 P.2d 110,
115 (1944); Dugand v. Magnus, 107 Cal. App. 243, 247, 290 P. 309, 310 (1930). See also
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161(b)(3).
5. 171 Cal. App. 3d 265, 217 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1985).
6. Id.
7. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners by Attorneys for the Santa Monica
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respond that the decision threatens important principles affecting the
security of title to real property.8 The Gross case represents yet another
component of the already controversial subject of rent control.9
Rather than address the legality or desirability of rent control
generally, the purpose of this comment is to examine the legal and
policy issues in Gross and a second case" on the same issue, focusing
primarily upon the relationship between local ordinances and state
statutes. This comment will contend that Gross gave little considera-
tion to important preemption questions, and relied instead upon a
distinction between procedural and substantive laws, which is highly
debatable and may miss the substance of the policy issue involved."
Further, the legislature has failed to provide clear guidance in this
area. Important property concepts are indeed involved in the con-
troversy; concepts that could have an impact on the ability to finance
needed residential rental property. 2 Finally, alternatives will be explored
that attempt to protect all parties.' 3
GROSS AND THE CONCEPT OF LIEN PRIORITY
A. Priority
In denying foreclosure sale purchasers the absolute right to posses-
sion of the foreclosed premises, the Gross court modified at least fifty
years of settled California law." Further, the court altered important
concepts of priority of liens. Before analyzing the case, a brief discus-
sion of the laws of priority will be helpful.
Lien priority laws reflect an elaborate scheme to determine the
relative rights of competing interests in real property. As is common
in American jurisdictions, the maxim "first in time, first in right"
Rent Control Board at 2, O'Connor v. Superior Court of San Francisco, No. 835195 (Cal.
1st Dist. Ct. App.) (on file at the Pacific Law Journalo.
8. Petition for Review of Decision of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Divi-
sion Two at 6, Herb Gross, James Mueller v. Superior Court of San Francisco, No. A-028012
(Cal. Sup. Ct.) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
9. Legislation designed to impose parameters on local authority to enact rent control was
introduced in both the 1983-84 and 1985-86 sessions of the California Legislature. The first
bill was unsuccessful, while the second is currently pending. See A.B. 3808, 1983-84, 2nd Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1984). See also A.B. 483, 1985-86, 1st Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1985).
10. O'Connor v. Superior Court, No. 835 195 (San Francisco Super. Ct. 1985), appeal
docketed, No. A-031145 (Cal. Ist Dist. Ct. App.).
11. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 117-82 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 181-89 and accompanying text.
14. As early as 1860, California courts held that foreclosure purchasers could maintain
ejectment actions against tenants of the former owner. McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580, 589
(1860). For a more modern treatment, see Bank of America, 64 Cal. App. 2d 175, 182-83,
148 P.2d 110, 115 (1944).
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is the starting point from which California law proceeds in determin-
ing rights among competing interests.' 5 In simplest form, the phrase
means that earlier recorded interests have priority over the interests
of subsequent parties who can examine the state of record title to
property.
Because both the right to possession and financial interests are at
stake, parties take priority very seriously. In a typical real estate trans-
action, the parties will contract for the purchase of a policy of in-
surance against claims of paramount title. 6 The decision to issue a
policy of insurance typically involves a title search to determine the
existence of prior record interests in the property.' 7 A buyer of, or
lender on, property must be concerned about prior possessory interests
that may be asserted by competing parties.
Lenders want the highest possible recorded priority so that if
foreclosure is necessary, the lenders will be unaffected by subsequent
interests in the property.' Proceeds of the foreclosure sale are allocated
to lienholders according to their priority. 9 Subsequent interests are
extinguished by the foreclosure. 20 The basic purpose of foreclosure
is to restore the mortgagee or beneficiary to the position enjoyed when
the lien was created. 2' As the facts of Gross demonstrate, the court
not only refused to restore the beneficiary to the position enjoyed
when the lien was created, but gave a subsequent leasehold interest
greater priority than that of the property owner who originally
borrowed the money.22
B. Gross v. Superior Court
In California, no prior reported cases had dealt with the precise
issue presented by Gross, although other states had confronted similar
questions. 23 The defendant and real party in interest in Gross was
15. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2897. See also Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Scheib, 218 Cal.
386, 389-390, 23 P.2d 745, 747-748 (1933).
16. The California Land Title Association estimates that at least 85% of all real property
sales in California involve the purchase of title insurance. Interview with Mr. Larry Green,
Executive Vice President, California Land Title Association in Sacramento, California (February
6, 1986) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
17. See Arthur B. Sid, Inc. v. Bridges, 189 Cal. App. 2d 599, 11 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1961).
18. See County of Butte v. North Burbank Pub. Util. Dist., 124 Cal. App. 3d 342, 345,
177 Cal. Rptr. 282, 283 (1981).
19. Sohn v. California Pacific Title Ins. Co, 124 Cal. App. 2d 757, 766, 269 P.2d 223,
229 (1954).
20. Bank of America, 64 Cal. App. 2d at 182-83, 148 P.2d at 115.
21. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 488
(1981).
22. See infra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
23. In 1947 the California Supreme Court decided a case in which defendant challenged
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Victoria Mews Consortium (VMC), a California corporation engaged
in the construction and sale of new condominiums.2 ' As the seller
of a San Francisco condominium, VMC took back a purchase money
second deed of trust, behind a first lien in favor of an institutional
lender. 25 Under the priority concepts discussed above, VMC was in
a junior position relative to the institutional lender.26
Three and one-half years after VMC's second trust deed was re-
corded, tenants Herb Gross and James Mueller took possession of
the condominium unit under a one-year lease with the owners." Subse-
quently, the owners defaulted on payments to both the first lienholder
and to VMC. To protect the junior interest from being extinguished
by foreclosure of the senior lien, VMC instituted nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings under California Civil Code section 2924.28
VMC purchased the condominium at the resulting trustees' sale,
and immediately served the tenants with a three-day notice to quit
the premises as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a. 29
When the tenants refused to leave, an unlawful detainer 3° proceeding
was instituted in the San Francisco Municipal Court.' The tenants'
primary defense was that the local San Francisco rent control ordinance
provided no grounds for eviction following foreclosure.3 2 The San
Francisco rent control law enumerates a series of "just causes" for
eviction. 33 Under the ordinance, landlords are limited to twelve per-
his eviction on the ground that state unlawful detainer statutes contravened the federal rent
regulations for housing, promulgated under the federal rent control provisions contained in
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Lovett v. Bell, 30 Cal. 2d 8, 180 P.2d 335 (1947).
The court stated in dicta that a purchaser at foreclosure could not oust a tenant "except in
pursuance of the rent regulation specifying the grounds for eviction." Id. at 13, 180 P.2d at
338. In New York, a purchaser at foreclosure has been barred from recovering possession in
violation of the local rent control ordinance. United Institutional Servicing Corp. v. Santiago,
62 Misc. 2d 935, 310 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1970).
24. Gross, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 269, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
25. Id.
26. McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. at 589.
27. Gross, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 269, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
28. Id.
29. Gross, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 269, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
30. Id. California's statutory eviction remedy is entitled unlawful detainer. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1161. Code of Civil Procedure § 1161 addresses most circumstances under which a
tenant may be removed for the tenant's action, e.g., nonpayment of rent or violation of lease
conditions. Section 1161a, in contrast, provides for termination and eviction under circumstances
in which the tenant may not be in default, such as when the property has been sold at foreclosure.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § l161a(b)(3). Despite the statutory requirement of delivery of a three-
day notice under § 1l61a(b), subsection (c) provides that tenants terminated and evicted following
foreclosure must be given a notice period at least as long as the term itself, not to exceed
30 days. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
31. Gross, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 269, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
32. Id. at 269, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
33. SAN FRANcIsco, CAL., ADMiN. CODE § 37.9(a)(1-12) (amended 1983).
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missible causes for eviction including nonpayment of rent, violation
of other tenant obligations, need for vacancy to effect rehabilitation
of the unit, desire of the landlord to occupy the unit personally or
by family, and other causes.34 Foreclosure is not provided as one of
the just causes.
The municipal court issued a judgment for VMC.33 Even if the
ordinance could be construed to apply to the foreclosure circumstance,
the court held, state law must control and permit eviction following
foreclosure.36 The appellate department of the Superior Court affirmed,
and an appeal was filed with the California Court of Appeal for the
First District.37
While the case was pending in the appellate court, the tenants volun-
tarily vacated the premises.3" The court denied a motion to dismiss
because of mootness, however, on the ground that the case presented
a continuing public controversy.39 On August 21, 1985, a unanimous
three-judge panel directed the Municipal Court to vacate judgment
for the purchasers and enter judgment for the tenants.4 0 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court denied review. 4
In finding for the tenants, the appellate court found that the terms
of the San Francisco rent control ordinance, directed at "landlords"
and "tenants," applied when a foreclosure sale purchaser attempts
to evict a tenant.42 Further, the court held that enactment of the
ordinance, including limitations on eviction, was a valid exercise of
local police power. "3 No conflict existed between the local ordinance
34. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMN. CODE § 37.9(a) (amended 1983). The following are
paraphrased descriptions of the 12 just causes permitting eviction under the San Francisco
ordinance: (I) failure to pay rent; (2) tenant violation of law or covenant of tenancy; (3) tenant
causing nuisance; (4) use of unit for illegal purpose; (5) tenant refusal to execute renewal or
extension of lease under substantially identical terms; (6) failure to allow landlord lawful access
to unit; (7) tenant holding over at expiration of term is a subtenant not approved by landlord;
(8) landlord wants possession for personal or family use; (9) unit is for sale following lawful
condominium conversion; (10) landlord wishes to demolish unit or permanently remove from
rental use; (11) temporary removal from housing use for capital improvements or rehabilita-
tion; and (12) removal from housing use for substantial rehabilitation. Id.
35. Victoria Mews Consortium v. Herb Gross, James Mueller, No. 853 903 (San Francisco
Mun. Ct., June 30, 1983) (judgment awarding possession in unlawful detainer action) (on file
at the Pacific Law Journal).
36. Id.




41. Gross v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. App. 3d 265, 217 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1985), review
denied, (Cal. Sup. Ct. October 17, 1985). Of the seven justices of the court, Justices Mosk
and Lucas were of the opinion that the petition for review should have been granted. Written
notification from California Supreme Court dated October 17, 1985 (copy on file at the Pacific
Law Journal).
42. Gross, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 274, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
43. Id.
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and state unlawful detainer law, so that the San Francisco ordinance
was not preempted by state law." Thus, the tenants could defeat evic-
tion based upon state unlawful detainer laws by raising as an affir-
mative defense that the local ordinance did not permit eviction follow-
ing foreclosure sales.
The precise question in Gross involved the relationship between evic-
tion limitations in a modern rent control ordinance and state
foreclosure and unlawful detainer statutes. Although this question was
never decided in California before, the issue is very likely to recur
in the future. Estimates are that over half of all rental units in Califor-
nia are now located in rent-controlled jurisdictions. " Of the approx-
imately fifteen jurisdictions which control residential rents for dwell-
ings other than mobilehomes, nearly all limit evictions to a set of
enumerated "just causes."4 6 Only one rent-control jurisdiction per-
mits eviction following foreclosure, subject to severe limitations.47 As
"creative financing" and a slowing of property appreciation combine
to increase the rate of foreclosures statewide, the likelihood increases
that tenants will resist unlawful detainer proceedings by raising local
ordinances as affirmative defenses.
Conflict between the San Francisco rent control ordinance and state
unlawful detainer statutes arose again in O'Connor v. Superior Court,"5
currently pending in the same appellate district that decided Gross.
The facts in O'Connor are more extreme than in Gross although a
significant portion of the problems in the case resulted from the dif-
ficulty in achieving service of process on the defendants. In O'Con-
nor, the purchaser at foreclosure was an institutional lender who had
provided financing on a three-flat building in San Francisco.49 The
44. Id.
45. Moscovitz, End of an Era, 5 CAL. LAW. 23 (1985).
46. According to data compiled by the California Association of Realtors, approximately
15 jurisdictions in California have enacted residential rent control provisions to dwellings other
than mobilehomes. Of these, at least nine enumerate the permissible grounds for eviction. Matrix
of ordinances and their respective grounds for eviction (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
47. The jurisdiction which permits eviction following foreclosure in limited circumstances
is West Hollywood. See WEsT HOLLYWOOD, CAL. ORDRNANCE No. 4413(A) (13) (1984). Evic-
tion is permitted only for single family residences and condominiums, and is subject to exten-
sion notice requirements and payment of relocation expenses ranging from $1,500 to $3,000
and beyond. Id. Internal report of the California Association of Realtors (on file at Pacific
Law Journal).
48. No. 835 195 (San Francisco Super. Ct. 1985), appeal docketed, No. A-031145 (Cal.
Ist Dist. Ct. App.).
49. Great Western Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Man-
damus, First Appellate District, Division Two at 9, O'Connor v. Superior Court of San Fran-
cisco, No. 031145 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App.). All factual contentions concerning O'Connor v.
Superior Court are from defendant real party in interest Great Western Savings' briefs and
memos and should not be taken as proved.
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lender had been told that the building would be at least partially owner-
occupied.5 0 After purchasing the building in foreclosure, the lender
learned that the property had been converted into a form of residen-
tial hotel, where "tenants" were charged between six and ten dollars
per night." The property was housing seventy to eighty tenants
nightly.2 The lender later learned that patients at a nearby drug
rehabilitation center had been referred to the property, and the
Travelers Aid desk at the San Francisco bus terminal was also referr-
ing individuals needing a place to stay."
The transient nature of the property made the lender's fulfillment
of the obligation to serve eviction notices on all the tenants extreme-
ly difficult. 4 The lender alleges that some of the tenants had actually
entered after the foreclosure sale, but before the eviction notices were
served." Most of the tenants left voluntarily upon accepting an offer
of cash from the lender, but others asserted a Gross-type defense to
foreclosure. 6 While the resulting unlawful detainer process proceeded,
the lender was forced to bring the building into compliance with San
Francisco health and safety codes, hire security guards to protect
against violence on the property, and pay all utility and garbage
charges." In all, the lender alleged that $265,000 was expended on
the property before it was sold. The building was secured by a $100,000
lien and finally sold for $125,000. The net loss to the lender, therefore,
was approximately $240,000.11 The circumstances in O'Connor may
appear more severe than Gross, but should the case proceed to final
disposition, no reason exists to believe that the outcome would be
different. The O'Connor case presents exactly the same legal conflict
as the Gross case, and is pending in the same court.
PREEMPTION: AN UNSETTLED DOCTRINE IN CALIFORNIA
Before addressing the specific preemption arguments that led to the
result in Gross, a more general description of the doctrine of state
preemption over local ordinances is necessary. The relationship be-
50. Id.
51. Letter from Charles Sledd, Counsel, Great Western Savings, to David K. Milton,
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tween state and local power is not analytically equivalent to the rela-
tionship between the federal and state governments. For example, the
California Constitution contains no clause equivalent to the United
States Constitution Supremacy Clause, which clearly states that United
States law is supreme within its field.59 The California Constitution
approaches preemption from the reverse perspective, delineating the
scope of allowable local authority."
Sections of the California Constitution address the local authority
of both chartered6' and general law62 cities. Article 11, section 7, applies
to general law cities, and describes the general police power provi-
sions applicable: "A county or city may make and enforce within
its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regula-
tions not in conflict with general laws." ' 63 The California Supreme
Court has construed this section to permit state enactments that cover
municipal affairs, as well as local enactments which go beyond
municipal affairs.
64
In the case of conflict between a state law and a local ordinance,
however, courts must determine whether the pertinent issue is statewide
or local in nature.65 The determination apparently rests entirely with
the judicial branch, and the state legislature will not be permitted
to expand a municipal issue into one of statewide concern.6 6 The courts
give "great weight" to state laws which disclose an intent to preempt
the field to the exclusion of local regulation.6 7 If the legislature also
enacted a comprehensive scheme for regulation of the subject, any
59. Compare U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 with CAL. CONsT. art. XI, §§ 5, 7.
60. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, §§ 5, 7.
61. Chartered cities are those which have elected to exercise California constitutional authority
to organize by adopting a charter upon a vote of the electors. CAL. CONST. art. Xl, § 3. Upon
adoption of the charter, general laws of the state are superseded by local law with respect
to municipal affairs. CAL. CoNsT., art. XI, § 5.
62. General law cities are those organized under general laws enacted by the state legislature.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 34102. A general law city is limited to those powers that are expressly
conferred by the legislature, together with the powers necessarily incident to those expressly
granted or essential to the declared object and purposes of the city. Irwin v. Manhattan Beach,
65 Cal. 2d 13, 20-21, 415 P.2d 769, 773, 57 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885 (1966).
63. CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 7. This section conveys a general grant and limitation of power
on all California cities and counties. See Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 681,
349 P.2d 974, 979, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (1960). Cf. CAL. CoNsr. art. XI, § 5 (grants an
additional "home rule" autonomy to chartered cities and counties).
64. Bishop v. City of San Jose, I Cal. 3d 56, 62, 460 P.2d 137, 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465,
468 (1969) (state Labor Code provisions held not to apply to wages paid to charter city employees).
See also Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 176, 339 P.2d 801, 809 (1959) (county right-to-
work ordinance invalid because in conflict with state laws on collective bargaining and union
shops).
65. Bishop, I Cal. 3d at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468-69.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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local ordinance is void if it "duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area
fully occupied by general law. ' 68 Absent state intention to preempt,
however, if a court determines an issue to be essentially municipal,
even nonchartered cities may prevail when their enactments conflict
with state laws. 9
Chartered cities are governed by another section of the California
Constitution, but on preemption, the issues are very similar to general
law cities. Under Article 11, section 5, city charters may provide for
enforcement of "all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal
affairs," but "in respect to other matters they shall be subject to
general laws." 7o With respect to direct conflicts between local
ordinances and state laws on matters of statewide concern, state law
will control.7 Also, state law will control if the legislature has
evidenced an intent to occupy the entire field of regulation.7" In sub-
ject areas fully occupied by state regulation, chartered governments
have no authority to act at all, whether to conflict or complement
state law.
73
In sum, both chartered and general law cities can legislate in the
same subject areas as the state, especially when the local regulations
"purport only to supplement the general [laws] by additional reasonable
requirements, or are in aid and furtherance thereof."7 4 State law,
however, will control over local ordinances in cases of direct conflict
on matters of statewide concern, and in cases in which the legislature
has evidenced an intent to preempt and occupy the field. The intent
to preempt can be either express or implied.75 The challenge is for
courts to determine when the legislature has impliedly preempted the
field of local regulation.
In preemption cases, courts are to look at "the whole purpose and
scope of the legislative scheme." ' 76 Three scenarios have been described
68. California Water & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles County, 253 Cal. App. 2d 16, 27, 61
Cal. Rptr. 618, 626 (1967).
69. Bishop, 1 Cal. 3d at 62, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
70. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
71. Whisman v. San Francisco Unified School District, 86 Cal. App. 3d 782, 789, 150
Cal. Rptr. 548, 551 (1978).
72. Lancaster v. Municipal Court, 6 Cal. 3d 805, 808, 494 P.2d 681, 682, 100 Cal. Rptr.
609, 610 (1972). See also In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 125, 396 P.2d 809, 814, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 393, 398-99 (1964); In re Zorn, 59 Cal. 2d 650, 651, 381 P.2d 635, 636, 30 Cal. Rptr.
811, 812 (1963).
73. Bishop, 1 Cal. 3d at 61, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
74. Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d at 124, 396 P.2d at 812, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (citing Pipoly
v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 370, 125 P.2d 482, 484 (1942)).
75. California Water & Tel. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d at 27, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
76. Madsen v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 119 Cal. App. 3d at 574, 581, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 531, 535 (1975).
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which should lead to state preemption."
The California Supreme Court, defining the first scenario, has stated
that preemption should occur when the subject matter of the regula-
tion has been so fully and completely covered by the general laws
of the state as to clearly indicate that the subject matter has become
exclusively a statewide concern." The second and third scenarios are
appropriate when state law only partially covers the subject matter.
When partial coverage exists, preemption should occur when state
general laws are couched in terms indicating that a paramount state
concern precludes local action, 79 or when local action would adverse-
ly affect transient citizens of the state without a higher benefit to
the local community.8" Preemption standards have been articulated
less formalistically, suggesting that the legislature has occupied the
field if the area of state legislation includes the subject matter of the
local legislation, and if a court or local legislative body "can detect
a patterned approach to the subject.""
APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CONTEXT
If the Gross case is viewed as presenting a conflict between state
unlawful detainer law and local eviction ordinances, the application
of conventional preemption principles to Gross would have required
the court to consider whether the state unlawful detainer statutes and
the local ordinance were in direct conflict on an issue of statewide
importance, or, in the alternative, whether the state legislature had
evidenced an intent to occupy the entire field of regulation.8" Both
tests require subjective evaluation by the courts, and are difficult to
apply to the Gross facts. A second formulation of a conflict presented
by the Gross case is suggested by the Gross facts positing a conflict
between the substantive rights of mortgagees under state law and the
concededly substantive nature of local rent control ordinances.
77. Hubbard attracted significant attention in the area of "preemption by implication."
See Comment, Preemptions by Implication Versus California Cities, 17 HASTwGs L.J. 603 (1966).
The three scenarios for "preemption by implication," when the legislature has not made an
express declaration of preemptive intent, have been widely cited. See Yuen v. Municipal Court
of San Francisco, 52 Cal. App. 3d 351, 354, 125 Cal. Rptr. 87, 89 (1975); Galvan v. Superior
Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851 859-60, 452 P.2d 930, 935-36, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647-48 (1969).
78. Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d at 128, 396 P.2d at 815, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Galvan, 70 Cal. 2d at 662, 452 P.2d at 937, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
82. See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
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A. Direct Conflict
Intuitively, Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(a) and the San
Francisco ordinance appear to be in direct conflict, because a
foreclosure sale purchaser cannot assert the rights and procedures pro-
vided under state law without violating the local ordinance. A tenant
cannot at the same time be evicted under state law and protected
under local law. The diametrically opposed results achieved by the
two provisions would clearly seem to be in direct conflict.
Court cases, however, are not determined according to intuitive
perceptions. The issue is whether the apparent inconsistency rises to
the level of a "direct conflict" for purposes of preemption analysis. 83
Narrowly construed, the two provisions are not in literal disagree-
ment. The state law does not expressly confer a right to possession
through unlawful detainer notwithstanding any local rent control
ordinance to the contrary.84 Similarly, the San Francisco ordinance
does not affirmatively prohibit evictions following foreclosures.8" What
the two provisions do set up, however, is a situation in which the
parties must make a decision "on the courthouse steps." '8 6 If state
law is to control, the foreclosure sale purchaser should proceed into
court for an unlawful detainer judgment. Should the provisions of
the local ordinance be determinative, the same purchaser will become
an involuntary landlord and is precluded from seeking evictions. While
not facially contradictory, the two provisions are in direct conflict
over the right to possession of real property.
The second step in the "direct conflict" component of preemption
analysis is to determine whether an issue of statewide importance is
involved.8 ' Apparently no easy guidelines exist to determine whether
an issue is predominantly statewide or municipal. Arguments of counsel
for the tenants in Gross are premised on the contention that the evic-
tion limitations in the San Francisco ordinance are fundamental to
83. Although the preemption cases make clear that state law will control over conflicting
local ordinances on matters of statewide concern, the cases do not reveal a consistent standard
for determining when a conflict exists. The courts generally debate whether an issue is statewide
or local, not whether a conflict exists. See John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of
Pacific Grove, 27 Cal. App. 3d 372, 103 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1972). The lack of clarity on the
issue of whether a conflict existed made it possible for the Birkenfeld court to suggest that
no conflict existed because the purposes of the two laws were distinct. Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 149, 550 P.2d 1001, 1015-16, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 479-80 (1976).
84. See CAL. Cirv. PROC. CODE § 1161, 1161a.
85. See SAN F.A~csco, CAL. ADmN. CODE § 37.9 (amended 1983).
86. The courthouse steps analogy is borrowed from the case of Boggs v. Blue Diamond
Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1121 (1980), a leading case in the area of federal-state choice
of laws issues.
87. See supra notes 61, 62, 65, 67, 71, and accompanying text.
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the local issue of controlling rents. 8 Indeed, except for the federal
rent control provisions enacted pursuant to the war powers in the
World War II era, rent control has been an exclusively local
phenomenon in California. 9 Conversely, purchasers' counsel point
to the longstanding existence of state laws for determining the priority
of real property interests.9"
The direct conflict presented by the Gross case is the different im-
pact on property owners of two inconsistent sets of laws. The Gross
court focused upon the procedural versus substantive distinction be-
tween state unlawful detainer statutes and local eviction ordinances,
and the following discussion suggests that their conclusion is ques-
tionable. Alternatively, it might be suggested that the real conflict
is between the substantive rights of mortgagees who must foreclose
to protect their security, and the local rent control ordinances which
limit eviction. Under either formulation, the real conflict is over the
right to possession of real property. While the Gross court avoided
this issue, analysis of the competing state and local interests
demonstrates that, on balance, the right to enforce a security interest
and recover possession of property should be uniform throughout the
state. On one hand, various elements of housing policy traditionally
have been determined at the local level. Where to locate housing, for
instance, is largely a function of zoning and general plans adopted
at the municipal level.9' Local housing authorities issue bonds which
frequently assist in the construction of residential rental housing. 92
Control of rents is also a permissible local exercise, necessarily in-
volving some control on eviction as an adjunct.93 Since housing policy
88. Gross, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 272-73, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
89. There is no statewide statutory scheme for control of rents, and thus far the legislature
has rejected attempts to establish or significantly curb local authority in this area. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
90. Petition for Review of Decision of the Court of Appeal at 8, Gross v. Superior Court
(on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
91. Municipal zoning power was upheld early in this century against attacks that it con-
stituted an unconstitutional taking. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). But
see CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65580-65589.8 (compelling local governments to absorb a fair share
of a region's low-to-moderate income housing needs, within locally-adopted housing elements,
demonstrating that zoning is not exclusively a municipal phenomenon). See also CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 66411 (within the Subdivision Map Act, limiting local agency regulation and control
of subdivisions).
92. Local governmental housing authorities issued approximately $6.8 billion in revenue
bonds for housing in 1985, according to figures supplied by the California Debt Advisory Com-
mission. The state also issued revenue bonds for housing totalling approximately $1.32 billion
in 1985. Telephone interview with Melinda Luedtke, Executive Secretary California Debt Advisory
Commission (February 10, 1986) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
93. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 148, 550 P.2d 1001, 1015, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 479 (1976).
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is partially municipal, the question of eviction following foreclosure
may have some local character.
Conversely, a number of factors suggest that the issue of posses-
sion of real property following foreclosure transcends local boundaries.
Financing for rental housing is commonly provided by lenders who
operate on a statewide basis and have an interest in uniformity and
predictability of laws.9" With respect to trustors, rental property is
frequently owned by legal entities that may own property in various
municipalities. 9 In unusual circumstances, a single large rental com-
plex could possibly be bisected by a municipal boundary line, and,
hence, be subject to inconsistent laws with respect to possession. The
business of financing and providing rental housing is not conducted
according to simple municipal boundaries. The state legislature has
shown great interest in providing incentives for housing throughout
California, creating a special state agency for housing finance,96 special
tax treatment for residential rental housing construction,9" and other
programs indicative of the identification of housing as a statewide
imperative.
The Gross court did not address the issue of competing state and
local interests in possession of real property. The question arises why
a lender's ability to obtain possession of property following foreclosure
should be made to depend upon which municipality is involved. The
right to possession should be based upon title, determined by state
laws of priority. Arguably when a possessory right depends upon an
alteration of priority laws, the municipal ordinance has intruded upon
an issue of statewide importance.
94. Real estate lenders do not operate according to defined municipal boundaries. In fact,
the exact geographical limits of various lenders' operations is an extremely complicated ques-
tion beyond the scope of this comment, depending upon the type of lender and the regulatory
structure involved. Many private lenders actually operate across state lines, on a regional or
national basis. The existence of "nonbank banks" is also assaulting the traditional prohibitions
against interstate banking. See Schellie & Climo, Nonbank Banks: Current Status and Oppor-
tunities; 102 BANKING L.J. 4 (1985).
95. Tax advantages and income potential have fueled a surge in syndications of limited
partnerships which invest in residential rental property, not only in different municipalities,
but in different states as well. Telephone interview with Joel Singer, Vice President, Economics
and Policy Analysis, California Association of Realtors (February 10, 1986) (notes on file at
the Pacific Law Journal).
96. The California Housing Finance Agency is established pursuant to Health and Safety
Code §§ 50900-51375.
97. The legislature has made special provisions to permit conformity to federal IRC sec-
tions on accelerated cost recovery system for eligible residential rental property in California
on which construction commences between July 1, 1985 and July 1, 1988. See REV. & TAX
CODE § 17250.5.
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B. Legislative Intent
The second test for determining whether state law preempts local
regulation of the same subject is analytically distinct from the direct
conflict test. If the legislature has demonstrated an intent to occupy
the entire field, state law must prevail even when the issue is partially
local. 98 Resolution of this question relies at least in part on which
"issue" is at stake. Obviously the legislature has not evidenced an
intent to occupy the entire field of either the subject of rent control,
since no statewide scheme exists, or of evictions, since some local
control of this issue is permitted. 99
Significant evidence does exist, however, that a comprehensive
scheme was intended for the issue of possession following
foreclosure.' 0 As currently written, Code of Civil Procedure section
1161a subjects all tenants to removal for holding over following
foreclosure: comprehensively treating tenants in manufactured homes,
mobilehomes, and all other forms of real property.'"' The section also
applies whether the property is sold pursuant to writ of execution,'0 2
judicial foreclosure sale, 03 private power of sale, 04 or default of con-
ditional sale contract for mobilehomes.' 5 The legislature seems to have
intended that all purchasers following default on any type of residen-
tial property should be entitled to possession through unlawful detainer,
consistent with the law establishing superior title.
The legislative history surrounding a 1983 amendment of section
1161a supplies perhaps the most persuasive evidence concerning the
intention of the legislature in regulating the field. Under the law prior
to the amendment, tenants evicted following foreclosures, could be
evicted following the three-day notice to quit customarily served upon
defaulting tenants.' 0 6 In a bill supported by both tenant and industry
organizations, the 1983 amendment required that tenants evicted follow-
ing foreclosures receive the same notice period as other nondefaulting
98. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
99. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 148, 550 P.2d 1001, 1015, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 479 (1976).
100. The court is permitted to look at the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme,
and is apparently not bound to consider only the narrow language of a single statute. For
cases discussing the entire purpose and scope of the legislative scheme, see Ecki v. Davis, 51
Cal. App. 3d 831, 849, 124 Cal. Rptr. 685, 694 (1975); Whitney v. Municipal Court of San
Francisco, 58 Cal. 2d 907, 909, 377 P.2d 80, 82, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18 (1962).
101. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 1161(a).
102. Id. § 1161(b)(1).
103. Id. § 1161a(b)(2).
104. Id. § 1161a(b)(3).
105. Id. § 1161a(b)(5).
106. Id.
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tenants."0 7 The "key issue" considered by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee was whether residential tenants should be given a greater notice
period than defaulting tenants before being subject to unlawful detainer
following foreclosure.' °8 In enacting the statute, the legislature mov-
ed to correct an anomaly in the law.
Additionally, an uncodified section enacted in a related bill expressed
the intent of the legislature not to affect the rights of tenants or
subtenants in possession when a unit is sold by the owner in a con-
ventional transaction.' 9 The legislature, faced with local rent control
ordinances forbidding eviction following a regular sale, presumably
was expressing an intent not to affect rights in that situation. With
respect to foreclosure sales, however, the intent was to provide for
eviction subject to expanded notice rights."
0
The right to evict following foreclosure can also be viewed as the
final element in the comprehensive legislative scheme in the foreclosure
area. When seeking to enforce a real property security instrument con-
taining a power of sale, a lender is subject to the detailed requirements
of section 2924 of the Civil Code."' Upon completion of the sale,
a purchaser is afforded the summary remedy of unlawful detainer
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1 161a provided that title has
been "duly perfected,""'  pursuant to the laws of priority contained
in the Civil Code. The system of regulation evidences a patterned
approach to the subject of possession of real property following
foreclosure. This is true whether the conflict identified is between the
substantive rights of mortgagees and local eviction limitations, or be-
tween state unlawful detainer and local ordinances. Unfortunately,
the legislature has failed to make an express declaration of intent.
An unequivocal declaration of legislative intent would assist courts
in evaluating the foreclosure issue according to standard preemption
concepts.
107. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 346, at 45 (enacting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161a(c)).
108. Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 1983-84 Regular Session, Comm. Analysis on A.B. 637,
1983-84, 1st Reg. Sess. (1983).
109. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 346, § 2, at 46. Uncodified sections are frequently used to express
legislative intent or findings, and while uncodified sections are considered by the legislature
and enacted along with the bills themselves, they are not entered into the official codes.
110. Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 1983-84 Regular Session, Comm. Analysis on A.B. 637,
1983-84, 1st Reg. Sess. (1983).
I11. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2924-2924g.
112. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §§ 1161a(b)(l)-(5). Whether the eviction follows a writ of
execution, judicial foreclosure, private power of sale or default on conditional sales contract,
title must be "duly perfected." Title is "duly perfected" when all steps have been taken to
convey to a purchaser property with title "valid and good beyond a reasonable doubt." Kessler
v. Bridge, 161 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 837, 841, 327 P.2d 241 (1958). These steps include perfor-
mance by the parties, establishment of good record title and other elements necessary to a
valid sale. Id.
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PREEMPTION STANDARD: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LAWS
In Gross, the court avoided the difficult questions of preemption
raised by the traditional tests, by holding that no conflict existed be-
tween state and local law in foreclosure evictions. Authority for this
position stems from the 1976 case of Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley" 3
which articulated a standard for preemption analysis based upon classi-
fying laws as procedural or substantive.
Birkenfeld is widely regarded as the seminal case providing the legal
underpinnings for local rent control in California. Among various
holdings in the case, the Birkenfeld court upheld the imposition of
rent control as a permissible exercise of local police power."" The
discussion by the California Supreme Court of the preemption issue
between the state unlawful detainer statutes and Berkeley's rent con-
trol ordinance is of particular interest.
In Birkenfeld, the plaintiffs contended that any local regulation of
the grounds for eviction was prohibited by the state unlawful detainer
statutes in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161.'11 Specifically, the
contention was that the section 1161(1) remedy in unlawful detainer
for a tenant holding over after the expiration of a tenancy preempted
the Berkeley ordinance. The ordinance did not include holding over
after the expiration of a tenancy as a permissible grounds for evic-
tion. 16 The court rejected this preemption argument, but held that
other elements of the Berkeley ordinance were, in fact, preempted
by state law." 7 In so doing, the court erected a distinction between
"procedural" and "substantive" laws which is crucial to the Gross
analysis.
Faced with an apparently direct conflict between Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 1161(1) and the Berkeley ordinance, the Birkenfeld court
nevertheless held that the two provisions did not conflict because their
purposes were distinct." 8 The purpose of unlawful detainer is pro-
cedural, the court reasoned, and was intended to afford landlords
a "relatively simple and speedy remedy that obviates any need for
self-help.""19 In contrast, the Berkeley ordinance conferred upon
tenants a substantive ground of defense against unlawful detainer,
a permissible local exercise of police power.' 20
113. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
114. Id. at 163-64, 550 P.2d at 1026-27, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
115. Id. at 148, 550 P.2d at 1015, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 151-52, 550 P.2d at 1017, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 481-82.
118. Id. at 149, 550 P.2d at 1015-16, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80.
119. Id. at 151, 550 P.2d at 1017, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
120. Id. at 149, 550 P.2d at 1016, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80.
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The court in Birkenfeld further defined the distinction between pro-
cedural and substantive laws. Once the conclusion was made that
unlawful detainer was a procedural device, the court held that the
state legislature had occupied the entire field with respect to the pro-
cedures for eviction.1 2 ' Since the Berkeley ordinance erected a series
of procedural hurdles for landlords seeking to evict tenants, including
the obligation to obtain a certificate of eviction from the local rent
control board, a conflict existed between two procedural provisions,
hence, the local ordinance was invalid.
22
To analyze the Birkenfeld case in relation to Gross, two questions
must be addressed. If Birkenfeld had not been found applicable in
Gross, presumably the appellate court would have employed the con-
ventional preemption analysis discussed above.' 23 The first question
is the degree to which the Birkenfeld case actually establishes a rule
of law applicable to Gross. Assuming that Birkenfeld is controlling
in Gross, the second question is the extent to which the Birkenfeld
analysis represents a workable contribution to the preemption dilemma.
The answer to the first question depends upon how expansively the
Birkenfeld opinion is read. In the narrowest sense, the Birkenfeld court
merely held that Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(1) does not
preempt the local ordinance so as to permit eviction following the
expiration of the lease term. 24 Consistent with this view, the Gross
court was urged to read Birkenfeld to mean only that a city has the
power, despite section 1161, to protect tenants against eviction follow-
ing the expiration of the lease term, as a means of enforcing max-
imum rent ceilings. 25 At least for cities that permit rent increases
upon vacancy, logic indicates that this conclusion is virtually in-
escapable once the local authority to enforce rent control is upheld.
A landlord's ability to evict tenants after the expiration of terms in
order to raise rents would undermine the entire concept of rent con-
trol.
26
121. Id. at 152, 550 P.2d at 1017, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
124. Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 152, 550 P.2d at 1018, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
125. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support Thereof, First Appellate District, Division Two at 17, Herb Gross,
James Mueller v. Superior Court of San Francisco, No. A-028012 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App.)
(on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
126. Rent control schemes effectively eliminate the concept of tenancies for a term, of
necessity. If landlords could evict tenants at the end of a six-month term, for instance, and
raise the rent to the market level for the subsequent tenant, rent control would have little
meaning. On the other hand, limiting "vacancy-decontrol" provisions to voluntary termina-
tions on the part of tenants removes the opportunity of raising rents through eviction. The
term might properly be called a "tenancy-at-tenant's-sufferance."
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
The precise issue in Birkenfeld thus went to the capacity of the
city to enforce a rent control scheme. The court expressly disavowed
any intention to consider other grounds for eviction which may have
been prohibited because they were excluded from Berkeley's "just
causes."' 27 The only issue considered in the foreclosure context was
whether the city could prohibit the eviction of a tenant in good standing
at the expiration of the tenancy, absent the existence of very limited
circumstances such as the withdrawal of a unit from the rental market
or the refusal of a tenant to accept the landlord's offer of a renewed
lease. 128
Eviction following foreclosure is thus a different omitted ground
than the expiration of tenancy ground involved in the Birkenfeld case
and, thus, Birkenfeld is arguably not controlling on facts such as
existed in Gross. Beyond this distinction, however, in Gross a city
was prohibiting eviction even when the entire legal basis for the
leasehold was eliminated.'2 9 A term did not expire in Gross; rather,
the landlord's title which upheld the leasehold interest was extinguished.
Despite uncertainties as to whether Birkenfeld was intended to reach
this far, the Gross court interpreted the opinion of the supreme court
very expansively.' 30 The Gross court seemed to read Birkenfeld to
mean that all unlawful detainer statutes are merely procedural devices
to regain possession of premises, while all eviction grounds omitted
from enumerated "just causes" raise substantive defenses for tenants. '",
Read in this fashion, a city could presumably conclude that a rental
housing or economic crisis warranted drastic action, and respond with
a provision that a tenant's inability to pay rent does not constitute
a permissible grounds for eviction. Birkenfeld would then prevent a
landlord from proceeding under section 1161, which expressly per-
mits unlawful detainer actions for nonpayment of rent. 13 2
Although the reading of Birkenfeld by the Gross court may be
accurate, the application of the distinction between procedural and
127. Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 148, 550 P.2d at 1015, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
128. Id.
129. See Bank of America, 64 Cal. App. 2d at 184, 148 P.2d at 117.
130. Gross, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 271-73, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88.
131. Id. at 272-73, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 288. The treatment by the court of the preemption
issue ends with the following unequivocal language:
Section 1161a is procedural and provides a method for recovery of possession of
real property. On the other hand, section 37.9 [of the San Francisco ordinance] is
substantive in that it limits the grounds for eviction. Passage of such legislation by
local government is an exercise of police power which substantively places a limita-
tion on the owner's property rights.
Id. at 272, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
132. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161(2).
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substantive laws can lead to absurd conclusions. Certainly cities are
unlikely, as a practical matter, to enact protections for tenants who
simply do not pay rent. Under a broad reading of Birkenfeld, however,
this type of ordinance could provide the basis for a substantive defense
under local police power. Similarly, suppose that the City of Fre-
mont, ' faced in the 1970's with the devastating effects of automobile
manufacturing plant closures, had concluded that a housing crisis was
occurring due to rising foreclosures. Had the city declared a foreclosure
moratorium, arguably the distinction between procedural and substan-
tive laws could have been utilized to validate a "substantive" local
law, in the face of "procedural" nonjudicial foreclosure statutes at
the state level.
At some point, all procedural remedies are designed to enforce some
substantive right. Of course, nonjudicial foreclosure and unlawful de-
tainer represent procedural remedies, but they are remedies intended
to facilitate enforcement of substantive determinations as to who is
entitled to possession of real property. When eviction following
foreclosure was added to the unlawful detainer statutes in 1929, the
legislature noted no intention to confer additional rights on property
owners."' On the other hand, no evidence exists that anyone in 1929
challenged the substantive law giving possession to foreclosure pur-
chasers following the sale; rather, recognition of this substantive right
is evidenced by the willingness of the legislature to give purchasers
a more "simple and speedy remedy."' 35
The distinction between procedural and substantive laws should be
viewed as an unfortunate addition to preemption law. Interestingly,
the United States Supreme Court has used the fact that the purposes
of state and federal laws are in conflict as a predicate for declaring
federal laws preemptive of state law, even when no facial conflict
exists, 3 6 while the California Supreme Court used divergent purposes
to deny preemption, even when the conflict is direct. The use of terms
133. Fremont, California is a city in the San Francisco Bay Area that has suffered through
automobile manufacturing plant closures in recent years. Faced with a rapidly increasing
foreclosure rate, there was apparently informal consideration of potential legislation to enact
a foreclosure moratorium at the state level. Interview with Dugald Gillies, Vice President, Govern-
mental Relations, California Association of Realtors, in Sacramento, California (November 17,
1985) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
134. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, in support of Peti-
tioners, First Appellate District, Division Two at 7, O'Connor v. Superior Court of San Fran-
cisco, No. A-031145 (Cal. Ist Dist. Ct. App.) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
135. Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 151, 550 P.2d at 1017, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
136. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (citing Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946)).
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like "procedural" and "substantive" is beguiling and facile, yet leads
to absurd results that may differ from the results under conventional
preemption analysis, and may ignore substantive rights underlying real
property laws.
POSSIBLE USE OF OTHER REMEDIES
The precise question in Gross involved the relationship between
statutory unlawful detainer and the local ordinance. The court noted
that the purchasers had elected to proceed "solely" under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1 161a. California law contains other forms
of action that the purchaser might have instituted to recover posse-
sion, including actions for quieting title and for ejectment. Analysis
of these alternative approaches suggests that they may not have pro-
vided any greater relief for the foreclosure purchasers than the unlawful
detainer remedy. The Gross dilemma cannot be solved merely by choos-
ing to style the action differently. The two forms of action will be
considered individually.
A. Quiet Title
An action to quiet title is equitable in nature and is authorized
in the California Code of Civil Procedure.' 37 A suit may be instituted
to remove a cloud on title, in which case the focus is on a document
or piece of evidence.' 38 Alternatively, the suit may be to determine
adverse claims to real property.' 9 The second application of the quiet
title action is more appropriate on the facts of Gross. The plaintiff
is challenging the claim of a party asserting an adverse interest or
estate in property.'40 The plaintiff may institute an equitable claim
to quiet title, along with a legal action for recovery of possession
in one proceeding.''
Actions for quieting title differ significantly from unlawful detainer
actions in the degree to which superior title is tried by the court.
The requirement in the summary unlawful detainer statutes that title
be "duly perfected" is a qualified exception to the general rule that
title is not tried in unlawful detainer actions.'"2 In contrast, the quiet
137. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 738. See also Dills v. Delira Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 124,
302 P.2d 397 (1956).
138. See Stearns v. Los Angeles City School Dist., 244 Cal. App. 2d 696, 53 Cal. Rptr.
482 (1966).
139. See Curtis v. Sutter, 15 Cal. 259 (1860).
140. Id.
141. People ex rel. Love v. Center, 66 Cal. 551, 556, 6 P. 481, 482 (1885).
142. Cheney v. Trauzettel, 9 Cal. 2d 158, 69 P.2d 832 (1937).
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title action relies on the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate superior title
to the property.'4 3 The existence of title in the plaintiff is a prere-
quisite for commencing the quiet title action.' 44 Unfortunately, the
requirement of title superior to the defendant's may beg the question
in the foreclosure sale context. Even in unlawful detainer, the pur-
chaser should have no difficulty establishing superior title according
to traditional property law precepts. The problem is determining
whether these precepts control over conflicting local ordinances.
Theoretically, the purchaser may have an advantage in proceeding
under a quiet title theory because the focus of the court is on the
validity of title and the adverse interest asserted thereto, rather than
on the right to possession. Even conceding that state law does not
occupy the entire field with respect to eviction following foreclosure,' 4S
the scope of the recording and priority statutes are very comprehen-
sive and appear to evidence an intent to exclude local regulation of
the subject. In attempting to move from an equitable judgment quieting
title to a legal judgment awarding possession, however, the Birkenfeld
analysis might again arise.
The action to quiet title may still be vulnerable under the Birkenfeld
distinction between procedural and substantive laws.' 4 6 Arguably, the
action confers no substantive rights upon the foreclosure sale pur-
chaser, but merely establishes a slower procedural alternative to
unlawful detainer.' 7 As in the unlawful detainer context, purchasers
would contend that the quiet title action is based upon substantive
state laws of recording and priority, but this did not persuade the
court in Gross.
B. Ejectment
A foreclosure sale purchaser might also elect to file a nonstatutory
tort action for ejectment. ' 41 Although this would constitute an unusual
use of an action more commonly employed in trespass or adverse
possession cases, ejectment is apparently available in the landlord-
143. Freeman v. Affiliated Property Craftsmen, 266 Cal. App. 2d 723, 734, 72 Cal. Rptr.
357, 367 (1968).
144. Reed v. Hayward, 23 Cal. 2d 336, 340, 144 P.2d 561, 563 (1943).
145. See supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
147. Although in the Gross context the unlawful detainer action and the action to quiet
title may be viewed as different approaches seeking the same result, authority exists to the
effect that a plaintiff may pursue both actions simultaneously. See Chaney v. Trauzettel, 9
Cal. 2d 158, 69 P.2d 832 (1937).
148. See Caperton v. Schmidt, 26 Cal. 479 (1864).
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tenant context.'4 9 The plaintiff must show that the tenant is wrongfully
in possession of the real property.' 0
Like an action for quieting title, the plaintiff normally proceeds
by demonstrating valid title to the real property, except in cases of
prior possession.' 5' In ejectment actions, however, the trial is over
the right to possession as between the parties.'5 2 Once plaintiff's title
is proven, the right to possession follows as a matter of law and the
judgment may be enforced for possession.'
Since relatively complex questions of title and right to possession
are involved, the ejectment action might be viewed as a superior vehicle
to a statutory unlawful detainer remedy for adjudicating the rights
of parties following foreclosure. Unlawful detainer is summary in
nature and not intended to address the complicated issues of title.'
5 4
Faced with an ejectment action, a court would presumably inquire
into the legal status of the purchaser and tenants. These issues
were briefed in Gross,'55 but were not determinative of the outcome.
Basically, the tenants contended that the definitions in the ordinance
of "landlord" and "tenant" applied on the Gross facts,'56 and that
the relationship between the parties constituted a common law tenancy
at sufferance.'5 7 Regardless of the type of tenancy involved, the argu-
ment is that the parties were properly characterized as "landlords" and
"tenants" such that the local ordinance applied. Conversely, the pur-
chasers maintained that they were not landlords and the "tenants"
not actually tenants under the San Francisco ordinance,' 8 and that
the common law relationship between the parties was owner and
trespasser.' 5 9
149. Lawrence Barker v. Briggs, 39 Cal. 2d 654, 661, 248 P.2d 897, 901 (1952) (action
for recovery of possession of parking lot, where complaint did not satisfy statutory requirements
of unlawful detainer).
150. Payne & Dewey v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220, 243 (1860) (action to recover possession
of rancho lands in early California).
151. See Whitaker v. Otto, 188 Cal. App. 2d 619, 10 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1961).
152. Payne & Dewey, 16 Cal. at 243.
153. Id.
154. Cheney v. Trauzettel, 9 Cal. 2d 158, 159-60, 69 P.2d 832, 833 (1937).
155. Petition for Mandamus and Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, First Appellate
District Division Two at 11, Herb Gross, James Mueller v. Superior Court of San Francisco,
No. A-028012 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App.).
156. Id. at 10.
157. At common law a tenancy at sufferance was created when a person went into posses-
sion of land lawfully and continued to occupy the land after the expiration of the term, without
benefit of title. See Gortlan v. C. A. Hooper & Co., 177 Cal. 414, 426 (1918).
158. Real Party in Interest Victoria Mews Consortium's Answer to Petition for Writ of
Mandamus, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, First Appellate District,
Division Two at 8-9, Herb Gross, James Mueller v. Superior Court of San Francisco, No.
A-028012 (Cal. Ist Dist. Ct. App.).
159. Id.
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An examination of the authorities cited by the Gross and O'Con-
nor antagonists concerning the legal status of the purchasers and
tenants does not reveal a clear rule of law. The foreclosure sale pur-
chasers cite nineteenth century precedent that the correct designations
are owner and trespasser. 6 ' The tenants cite slightly more modern
authority that a tenancy at sufferance is created,' 6 ' but the purchasers
argue in response that laches must be demonstrated in order to establish
such a tenancy.162
Like the quiet title action, ejectment is probably also vulnerable
under the Birkenfeld distinction between procedural and substantive
laws. 63 A court might reason that the summary procedural remedy
of unlawful detainer is merely a limited statutory action in the nature
of ejectment; therefore, the essential procedural character of the two
actions is identical. s'6  The response, again unpersuasive in Gross,'65
is that even if procedural in nature, ejectment is an action to enforce
substantive rights concerning possession to property. The issue of
rightful possession is what creates the conflict between state and local
law.
As alternatives to unlawful detainer, ejectment and quiet title also
possess an obvious timing deficiency. Uniawful detainer was specifically
designed as a summary device and is accorded special preference in
court administration.' 6 6 The foreclosure sale purchaser quite logically
would prefer to press a claim for possession under the speedy unlawful
detainer statutes, rather than undergo the lengthy process of an
ordinary civil action. This preference is understandable in light of
160. Great Western's Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Man-
damus, First Appellate District, Division Two at 14, O'Connor v. Superior Court of San Fran-
cisco, No. A-031145 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App.) (citing McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860)
(action for ejectment brought by foreclosure sale purchaser against tenant of former owner)).
161. Petition for Mandamus and Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, First Appellate
District, Division Two at 11, Herb Gross, James Mueller v. Superior Court of San Francisco,
No. A-028012 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App.). See Gortlan v. C. A. Hooper & Co., 177 Cal. 414
(1918) (action to quiet title in rancho lands, holding vendee under installment land contract
with defaulting vendor to be tenants at sufferance of foreclosure sale purchaser).
162. Respondent's Answer to Petition for Mandamus and Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support Thereof, First Appellate District, Division Two at 8, Herb Gross, James
Mueller v. Superior Court of San Francisco, No. A-028012 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App.) (citing
42 CA. JUR. 3D Landlord and Tenant § 53 (1978).
163. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
164. The contention that unlawful detainer is a summary remedy provided in statute for
possession of real property is well documented. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
Ejectment is also an action for recovery of possession, although not provided in statute, and
hence may be viewed as related remedies. See Craviatto v. All Persons, 93 Cal. App 346, 352,
269 P. 760, 762 (1928).
165. 171 Cal. App. 3d 265, 217 Cal. Rptr. 284.
166. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1167, 1179a.
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the uncertainty whether the alternative actions confer any substantive
legal rights not provided by unlawful detainer.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GROSS
Assuming that the Gross case brings state real property law into
conflict with local rent control ordinances,' 7 the question arises
whether practical or policy justifications exist for treating foreclosure
sale purchasers any differently than regular purchasers of property.
The opposing parties in Gross apparently concede that those purchasers
who succeed to the owner's interest, upon a conventional purchase
of property, should take subject to existing tenancies.' 8 Whether a
foreclosure sale purchaser deserves different treatment involves an ex-
amination of the related topics of fairness to all parties and possible
undesirable practical consequences of the Gross decision.
The idea that nondefaulting tenants deserve some degree of protec-
tion from the foreclosure process has some merit. Not only is there
a special sensitivity to the sanctity of a living space, but in rent-
controlled communities, the evicted tenant is quite likely to face a
difficult search and higher rents after losing possession. The process
of termination and eviction may be entirely unrelated to any action
by the tenant, whose timely rental payments may simply not have
been applied to the mortgage. On the other hand, the evicted tenant
has received value, in the form of housing, for the rental payments,
whether the funds are applied to the mortgage or not.' 69
In contrast, foreclosure sale purchasers contend that a fundamen-
tal distinction exists between the voluntary landlord status brought
about through a normal purchase, and the involuntary status created
following a foreclosure. 70 The lender entered the original transaction
as a funding source, and may not possess the resources, expertise,
or interest to function as a landlord. The elderly couple who take
back a second mortgage in order to sell the family home, and then
167. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
168. Petition for Review of Decision of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Divi-
sion Two at 27, Herb Gross, James Mueller v. Superior Court of San Francisco, No. A-028012
(Cal. Sup. Ct.).
169. Tenants evicted in the foreclosure circumstance may still suffer a financial loss, because
security deposits, including advance rental payments and other nonperiodic payments may be
lost. The vulnerability of tenants to such loss is open to question since the enactment of Chapters
1291 and 1555, Statutes of 1985, in the California legislature. Both chapters amend § 1950.5
of the Civil Code, and attempt to make "successors in interest" of landlords jointly and severally
liable for the unlawful retention of tenants' security deposits. See 1985 Cal. Stat. ch. 1291,
at 138, and ch. 1555, at 549 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.5).
170. Great Western's Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Man-
damus, First Appellate District, Division Two at 2-6, O'Connor v. Superior Court of San Fran-
cisco, No. A-031145 (Cal. Ist Dist. Ct. App.).
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is forced to foreclose in order to save the investment,'71 may be par-
ticularly disinclined to face the rigors of being landlords.
The involuntary landlord question arose in a different context in
Nash v. City of Santa Monica.' " Nash was a case in which an apart-
ment building owner was effectively prevented from tearing down a
building and going out of business by a local regulation requiring
a demolition permit before removing a building from the local housing
stock.'" In both the Nash and Gross contexts, the landlord can always
sell the building to another landlord. In a depressed market, however,
the existence of this option may be meaningless. A fundamental ques-
tion also exists whether local governments should be able to contradict
state law so as to leave foreclosure sale purchasers with the forced
choice of acting as involuntary landlords or selling to different, volun-
tary ones.
The sponsors of legislation enacted in 1985 to address the Nash
holding'74 contend that the new law creates other options for landlords
who sincerely wish to remove property from the rental market. Prop-
erty could be removed from the rental market by selling to owner-
occupants, or by demolishing the building or otherwise converting
to a nonresidential use.'" Assuming that the recent legislation is deemed
to preempt local rent control ordinances, the purchasers in Gross would
have the option of selling the unit to owner-occupants, since the unit
was legally built and sold as a condominium.' 76 The elderly couple
renting out the family home should possess the same right. But for
the foreclosure sale purchaser of units which are not, and cannot be
converted to, single family residences, the options are severely limited.
Such purchasers can either act as landlords, sell to others who will
171. Of course, the lender is not required to institute foreclosure proceedings, but the options
are decidedly unattractive. For a senior lender, the option is to forego the payments, while
a junior lender must not only plan to forego the payments but also risk 'being wiped out if
the senior lender forecloses. Then too, no lender is forced to bid at the resulting trustee's
sale, but as a practical matter a bid must be entered to save the investment. Otherwise, another
party could enter an extremely low bid, well under the lien amount, and in most cases the
lender would be prevented from obtaining the difference from the borrower because of Califor-
nia's antideficiency laws. See CAL. CIy. PROC. CODE § 580b.
172. 37 Cal. 3d 97, 688 P.2d 894, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1984).
173. Id.
174. 1985 Cal. Stat. ch. 1509 (adding CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7060-7060.7). The sponsor of
the legislation was the California Association of Realtors. The new legislation prohibits local
governments from preventing a landlord from permanently removing residential rental property
from the market, but leaves intact local authority to impose mitigation exactions such as relocation
expenses. Interview with John W. Shelby, Legislative Advocate, California Association of
Realtors, Sacramento, California (January 7, 1986) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
175. Interview with John W. Shelby, Legislative Advocate, California Association of Realtors,
Sacramento, California (January 7, 1986) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
176. Gross, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 269, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
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take subject to existing tenancies, or demolish the building for another
use. Thus, purchasers may be forced to choose between the emotional
toll of being landlords and the financial toll of selling in unfavorable
circumstances, such as existed in the O'Connor case.' 77
The Gross holding also leaves open the practical question of the
extent to which actual leases between the former owners and tenants
are deemed to continue. '78 One California court has held that even
after an eviction following foreclosure, the specific issue of the amount
of rent can be determined by rent control laws,' 79 but whether other
terms of the lease will be enforced is unknown. If an apartment lease
contained unusual cleaning services or other special considerations as
a part of the rent, whether the foreclosure purchaser could be re-
quired to perform these services is unclear.
The Gross case also leaves the foreclosure process open to abuse.
The possibility exists that a financially troubled single family
homeowner, looking ahead at default and foreclosure, could decide
to strike back by renting the unit at an amount below the market
price to a friend or relative. Upon purchasing the unit, the new owner
presumably would be entitled only to the existing rent, plus allowable
cost-of-living increases.' Again, the legislation designed to address
the Nash case may permit a sale to an owner-occupant, but if sold
to an investor, the unit will be subject to the below-market rent.' 8'
Counsel for the tenants in O'Connor also correctly suggested that
if the purchaser were able to evict following foreclosure, collusion
between the owner and lender could result in abuse designed to in-
crease rents.' 82 This concern may be ameliorated by the holding in
an appellate court case that any rent control on a unit will remain
applicable even after an eviction following foreclosure. "
PosSmLE SOLUTIONS
Gross raises a number of difficult questions of fairness and prac-
ticality. Desirable solutions should take into account the importance
177. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
178. The precise holding is that eviction limitations in the local ordinance constitute affir-
mative defenses to Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a unlawful detainer actions. Gross, 171 Cal.
App. 3d at 277, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 291. The survival of lease terms was not addressed.
179. People v. Little, 143 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 14, 19-20, 192 Cal. Rptr. 619, 623 (1983).
180. The possibility exists, of course, that lenders or other foreclosure purchasers faced
with a tenant in possession under a rent vastly below market might develop other theories
of action, based upon bad faith, etc.
181. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7060.2(a)(1) (effective July 1, 1986).
182. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, First Appellate District, Division
Two at 8, O'Connor v. Superior Court of San Francisco, No. 835 195 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App.).
183. 143 Cal. App. 3d, Supp. 14, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 619, 623 (1983).
1986 / Property Rights
of the tenants' home, as well as the circumstances of the foreclosure
purchasers. Further, the solutions should be workable and do as little
harm as possible to the important property law concept of priority
which protects the enforcement of security interests in property.
Allowing the Gross decision to stand unchanged could have serious
consequences. The financing and construction of rental housing is a
social imperative, and this socially useful activity should not be un-
necessarily hindered. The degree to which Gross would actually act
as a disincentive to investment is difficult to measure. Even critics
of the decision concede that a wholesale withdrawal from residential
rental lending and construction will not occur.' 8 Decisions on develop-
ment are based upon a variety of considerations, including financing
costs, land costs, vacancy levels, and perhaps the existence of rent
control generally. Supporters of the Gross holding maintain that
henceforth, lenders will simply be operating on notice that should
foreclosure be necessary, tenancies will survive.' The Gross court
drew an analogy to zoning,"86 which admittedly can reduce the value
of property after an individual has come into ownership, but which
is accepted as a legitimate exercise of local police power.' 8 7 On the
other hand, Gross is properly viewed as a protenant decision which
denies a previously existing right to the foreclosure sale purchaser.
In combination with other factors such as rent control, strict liability
for landlords,'88 and possible reductions in tax incentives, the deci-
sion does not contribute positively to the decision to invest.
Alternatively, state law could be enacted to require that local rent
control ordinances either conform to Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1161a and permit eviction following foreclosure, or provide for
rent increases as a matter of right if rents are significantly below market
or otherwise show an intent to frustrate foreclosure. Any proposal
to allow rent increases upon a showing of intent to frustrate foreclosure
would have the disadvantage of subjectivity, as someone must deter-
mine when the foreclosure process has been abused. The option also
fails to address the involuntary landlord problem, which occurs
whenever a foreclosure sale purchaser acquires property subject to
tenancies arising subsequent to the foreclosed lien.
184. Great Western's Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Man-
damus, First Appellate District, Division Two at 5-6, O'Connor v. Superior Court of San Fran-
cisco, No. A-031145 (Cal. Ist Dist. Ct. App.).
185. Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Application for Stay, Points and Authorities in
Support Thereof, First Appellate District, Division Two at 19, O'Connor v. Superior Court
of San Francisco, No. 835 195 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App.).
186. Gross, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 274, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
187. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
188. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
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From the perspective of protecting all parties, the best option is
to reverse the Gross opinion in the supreme court or legislature.' 89
If Gross is reversed, the traditional concept of priority would per-
mit eviction, but leave in place local authority to provide for displace-
ment mitigation.' 90 A growing number of jurisdictions presently re-
quire relocation assistance and other benefits intended to mitigate the
effects of displacement,' 9' and these provisions should not be viewed
as contradicting state law on priority and possession unless they are
confiscatory and prevent eviction de facto. The necessity of a tenant
giving up a "unique" residence may be viewed as one of the risks
allocated to being a tenant.
With Gross reversed, traditional concepts of recording and priority
are left essentially unchanged, in that the foreclosure sale purchaser
receives title free of subsequent interests. Predictability, stability, and
insurability of title are protected. Courts will not be required to decide
the fate of unusual lease terms. The fundamental notion that a
leasehold is a conveyance of an estate in real property from grantor
to grantee will be affirmed, avoiding the Gross implication that the
lease is somehow greater than the interest possessed by the grantor
and stems from the provisions of the local rent control ordinance.
CONCLUSION
By holding that state unlawful detainer statutes do not preempt
local rent control ordinances which prohibit eviction following
foreclosure, Gross v. Superior Court throws into doubt a number of
important concepts in California property law. The precepts that a
grantee can receive no better title than that possessed by the grantor,
and that valid foreclosures wipe out all interests junior to the lien
189. A bill was introduced in the 1985-86 regular session of the California legislature which,
as introduced, would have declared state unlawful detainer statutes in the foreclosure context
to be substantive and preemptive of conflicting local ordinances. Drawn into the debate over
rent control generally, the bill engendered heavy opposition and died without action in the
Judiciary Committee of the State Senate. S.B. 1705, 1985-86, 2nd Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1986). Inter-
view with David K. Milton, California League of Savings Institutions, Sacramento, California
(June 19, 1986) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
190. In the legislation introduced to address Nash v. City of Santa Monica case, the California
Legislature specifically provided that although landlords have a right to permanently cease offering
residential property for rent, nothing in the legislation should be construed to invalidate local
provisions with respect to displacement mitigation. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060.1(c)(1-2) (ef-
fective July 1, 1986). This might be viewed as an endorsement of displacement mitigation,
which exists in many rent-controlled jurisdictions. (Matrix developed by the California Associa-
tion of Realtors, on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
191. Merina, Panel Moves to Protect Tenants Facing Eviction, L.A. Times, February 6,
1986, pt. II, at 1, col. 4 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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foreclosed, are both undermined by the holding in the case. Real prop-
erty lenders can be severely disadvantaged by an inability to recover
possession following foreclosure.
In holding that the local ordinance controlled over state unlawful
detainer law, the court in Gross ignored conventional modes of preemp-
tion analysis and relied on the questionable distinction between pro-
cedural and substantive laws articulated in Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley. The court also ignored the substantive rights granted to
mortgagees by the laws of foreclosure. Application of the distinction
between procedural and substantive laws in the foreclosure context
fails to recognize that the procedural nature of unlawful detainer is
based upon substantive rights to possession of real property confer-
red by the laws of priority. Even if conventional preemption doc-
trines had been employed, the analysis of the Gross court would have
been hindered by the lack of clear guidance from the legislature con-
cerning the preemptive nature of the unlawful detainer remedy.
Even though the Gross holding will not result in the wholesale
elimination of rental housing investment and construction, the com-
bination of that holding with other factors such as strict liability for
landlords, rent control, and reduced tax incentives creates a disincen-
tive. Affirming that the statutory remedy of unlawful detainer following
foreclosure preempts conflicting local ordinances would protect im-
portant property concepts of recording and priority. Such preemp-
tion would not prevent local governments from mitigating the adverse
effects on nondefaulting tenants displaced by the foreclosure process.
Michael D. Belote
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